Although recent studies have shown that electricity systems with shares of wind and solar above 80% can be affordable, economists have raised concerns about market integration. Correlated generation from variable renewable sources depresses market prices, which can cause wind and solar to cannibalize their own revenues and prevent them from covering their costs from the market. This cannibalization appears to set limits on the integration of wind and solar, and thus contradict studies that show that high shares are cost effective. Here we show from theory and with numerical examples how policies interact with prices, revenue and costs for renewable electricity systems. The decline in average revenue seen in some recent literature is due to an implicit policy assumption that technologies are forced into the system, whether it be with subsidies or quotas. If instead the driving policy is a carbon dioxide cap or tax, wind and solar shares can rise without cannibalising their own market revenue, even at penetrations of wind and solar above 80%. Policy is thus the primary factor driving lower market values; the variability of wind and solar is only a secondary factor that accelerates the decline if they are subsidised. The strong dependence of market value on the policy regime means that market value needs to be used with caution as a measure of market integration.
Introduction
Rising shares of wind and solar in electricity markets around the world have led to concerns about their market integration at high penetrations. Several studies have found empirical evidence that electricity prices have decreased in markets with a high share of variable renewable energy (VRE) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The reason behind the lower prices is that the additional wind-and solar capacity bid into the market with their marginal costs, which are close to zero. This pushes out some of the more expensive generators, and, since the price is usually set by the marginal cost of the last generator needed to satisfy demand, the prices are depressed during times of wind/solar generation. Lower prices lead to lower revenues for all generators (the 'merit order effect' [2] ), but especially so for wind-and solar generators, since their generation depresses prices exactly when they are generating most, an effect known as 'cannibalization' [7, 8] . Both the generally lower prices and the cannibalization effect have been perceived as problematic, because they lead to lower revenues and would lead to less incentive to invest in new capacity in a free market [3, 9] .
These empirical observations [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] were made in electricity systems where the existing conventional power generation fleet remained largely unchanged (i.e. it is a short-term effect). The decline in revenue for wind and solar with their penetration has also been demonstrated in computer models of the power market where investments in all generator capacity are optimised [10] [11] [12] [13] (i.e. in a long-term equilibrium). The size of the effect was estimated to be a decrease in revenues by half at penetration levels of 15% (solar) and 30% (wind) [12] . The hypothesis put forward in these papers is that it is the variability of wind and solar that causes the decline [10, [12] [13] [14] .
The idea that variability sets a ceiling for the cost-effective penetration level of VRE electricity has been influential. Blasquez [15] claims that "The Paradox holds as long as market clear prices with short term marginal costs, and renewable technology's marginal cost is close to zero and not dispatchable", i.e. that energy-only markets with variable renewables inherently entail decreasing market value with penetration levels. Some have even suggested that the capacity factor (typically 10-25% for solar and 20-40% for onshore wind) should be considered as a limit on penetration [16] .
In apparent contradiction to the above-mentioned market integration studies, the last few years have also seen an increasing number of cost-minimizing energy system studies with high shares (>80%) of variable renewables [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . The system solutions of these studies correspond to long-term equilibria where all generators, including VRE technologies, exactly cover their costs with their market revenue (the 'zero-profit rule' [27] ). This seems to contradict market value studies that claim that wind and solar revenue will be pushed below the cost-recovery level at high penetrations.
Here we resolve this contradiction by showing in economic theory, mathematics and in model simulations how cost, revenue and policy interact. We show that market value studies find declining market value by construction because of the VRE support policies they choose to implement (be it quotas, feedin tariffs, feed-in premiums or capacity incentives). If instead carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) taxes are used as the primary policy instrument to raise wind and solar share, then VRE revenue will always be sufficient to cover generation costs. While many market studies have considered the impact of CO 2 taxes [12, 13] , CO 2 taxes have only ever been a subordinate policy to the main policy of VRE support. The resolution of the paradox requires replacing VRE support with CO 2 reduction incentives.
In this paper we focus on long-term effects in power market models where the entire fleet investment can be optimized. First we consider the economic theory (Section 3), show it in a theoretical optimization model (Section 4) and then demonstrate the effects in a reimplementation of the energy system model EMMA used in [12] in the PyPSA modelling framework [28] (Section 6).
Economic theory
3.1. Zero-profit rule, market value and LCOE without policy measures In a long-term equilibrium, where generator capacity is optimised along with power system operation under idealised conditions of perfect market competition without any further constraints, producers make zero profit in the long-term equilibrium [27] . If any producer makes a net profit, new producers will enter the market and competition will drive profits to zero; similarly if producers make a net loss, some will exit the market until losses are eliminated. For electricity markets, this zero-profit condition means in a long-term equilibrium that the average revenue that generators receive from the market exactly cover their costs.
The zero-profit condition can be restated per unit of generated energy in terms of the market value MV s and levelized cost of electricity LCOE s of each generator s: Figure 1 : The effect of VRE and CO 2 policies on energy-only electricity markets in the short-and long-term, for a system where zero-CO 2 -emission generators also have zero marginal costs (like wind and solar). a) The short-term effect of a VRE policy introduces more VRE capacity, and thus increases the part of the supply curve that is zero. The non-VRE supply curve is unchanged. b) The long-term effect is that some non-VRE generators are pushed out of the market, and thus the non-VRE supply curve becomes steeper. c) The shortterm effect of a CO 2 policy is to make the non-VRE supply curve steeper. d) In the long-term, the rising prices due to the increase of bid prices makes room for investment in VRE. The dotted lines indicate the market clearing price before policy (black) and after policy (red). The arrows indicate the direction of change of the supply curve (dashed) and market price (dotted).
The market value is defined as the revenue averaged over each unit of energy sold. The LCOE is defined as the sum of all investment, fuel, operational and maintenance costs averaged over each unit of generated energy. The equality (1) is proved for a general long-term equilibrium power model in the Section 4.1.
Different generators have different market values because they occupy different niches in the optimal system, depending on their characteristics such as cost and availability.
VRE policies
Additional policy measures alter the zero-profit condition described above.
Under 'VRE policy' we group all policies that encourage wind and solar investment beyond the pure cost-optimum, either by mandating a certain share of VRE, or by creating a revenue stream independent of the electricity market. Examples of such policies include Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards (RPS) in various US states and Feed-in Tariffs (FiT) in Germany, which gives a renumeration for every unit of energy generated from wind and solar.
The fact that an additional subsidy is required to achieve a higher share implies that the generator no longer makes sufficient revenue from the market to cover its costs. The subsidy required to cover costs can be translated into an equivalent Feed-in Premium (FiP) µ s > 0 paid per unit of generated energy, thus modifying the zero-profit condition at equilibrium to
The FiP tops up the average revenue received by the generator from the market to the LCOE so that the generator covers its costs.
This relation holds regardless of the policy. If VRE generation is forced to cover a fixed share of demand, we show in Section 4.3 that µ s is the shadow price of the corresponding constraint. If the share of VRE generation available before curtailment is fixed instead of the actual generation [12, 29] , µ s is proportional to the shadow price of the constraint (see Appendix B.1). If generators do not participate in the market at all, but are paid a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) to cover their costs at the same level as the LCOE, then µ s is the difference between the average market value and the tariff.
The equivalent FiP, µ s , rises with the deviation from the pure cost-optimum without the VRE policy, thus suppressing the market value. The decline in market value is an indirect effect of the decline of market prices during the hours of VRE production. The mechanism for the effect of VRE policies is schematically depicted in Figure 1 for the short-term ( Figure  1a ) and long-term ( Figure 1b ). That market revenue sinks with a rising forced penetration is the essential result observed in the literature on the market value of renewables [10, 12, 13] .
This does not contradict the zero-profit condition, since it only applies to an undistorted equilibrium. We have departed from the equilibrium solution by forcing a share of a technology. The other technologies are still freely optimized, and are thus still subject to the zero-profit rule, although their share of total generation will be lower.
CO 2 policies
CO 2 policies include direct CO 2 taxes and CO 2 caps with traded certificates. They indirectly support wind, solar and other low-emission technologies by penalising high-emission generators.
Under CO 2 policies, the zero-profit rule still holds, but the relationship between revenue and costs now include the equivalent CO 2 tax µ CO 2 (in euro per tonne of CO 2 , A CtCO −1 2 ) and the technology-specific emission factor e s (in tCO 2 MWh −1 )
This relation is proven in Section 4.4. For technologies like wind and solar with no emissions, we have exact cost recovery MV s = LCOE s . CO 2 -emitting generators have to cover both generation costs and the CO 2 tax with their market revenue at equilibrium, and are thus pressured out of the market to the benefit of low-CO 2 generation. CO 2 policies raise the market values of CO 2 -emitting generation by raising prices at hours when they are setting the price, see Figure 1 for the short-term ( Figure 1c ) and long-term effect (Figure 1d ).
Comparison of VRE-and CO 2 policies
The effects of the two types of policy are strikingly different. VRE policies depress market prices when renewable generators are running and offer them compensation outside of the market, whereas CO 2 policies raise market prices when fossil-fueled generators are running, thus encouraging low-emission generators into the market. For renewable generators, VRE policies increase their share but reduce their average market revenue, whereas CO 2 policies increase their share while leaving their zero-profit condition intact. For fossil-fueled generators, VRE policies reduce their share of the market but do not affect the zero-profit condition, while CO 2 policies increase the overall costs they need to cover from the market, thus also reducing their share. Figure 2 provides an illustration of how the two policies impact dispatch, price and momentary revenue in a simple case with solar and three fossil technologies (lignite, hard coal and gas). The VRE policy lowers prices both by the merit order effect when solar is feeding in and by turning prices negative when solar is price-setting (see the next section for a discussion of this mechanism). Under the CO 2 policy, prices go to zero when solar is price-setting, but this is more than compensated by the rise in prices when the fossil-fuelled generators are price-setting. With no policy, there is sufficient revenue for solar to cover its costs. For the CO 2 policy this is also the case, since the area under the revenue curve is the same, but the hours when solar earns change: it earns less at midday, but more on the flanks of its generation profile. For the VRE policy, prices and revenue are lower at all times when it generates, so solar cannot cover its costs from the market.
Additional flexibility options such as transmission, demand response and storage alter the background system by allowing price arbitrage to smooth the variability of renewable generators [12, 30, 31] . By providing more demand in hours with low prices, flexibility helps to raise prices when renewables are abundant [32] . More flexibility means that lower subsidies are required for VRE policies to reach a given penetration level, while for CO 2 policies a lower CO 2 price is required for a given abatement level when flexibility is available.
Mathematical theory
In this section we use a long-term optimisation model to show how prices and market values relate to costs and policy measures, and in particular under what circumstances the 'zero profit' rule holds. Proofs are provided for the equations stated in the previous section. The optimization problem setup and use of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions follows the textbook by Biggar and Hesamzadeh [33] .
Long-term equilibrium without policy measures
We maximize yearly social welfare for a single node with linear supply cost functions in a long-term equilibrium:
Here t labels time periods representing a year of load and weather conditions, a labels consumers, s labels generators, d a,t is the demand, g s,t is the generator dispatch, G s is the generator capacity andḡ s,t ∈ [0, 1] is the availability/capacity factor (which varies with time for variable renewable generators like wind and solar). λ t is the marginal price of electricity, whileμ s,t and μ s,t represent shadow prices of the generator constraints. c s represent fixed annual costs, while o s represent variable costs. U a,t (d a,t ) is the differentiable consumer utility function.
Conventions are chosen such that λ t is positive if the pricesetting generator has positive marginal costs, and such that all shadow prices µ are positive or zero. The definition of the Lagrangian L and KKT conditions are provided in Appendix A.
From KKT stationarity we have for the variables representing the generator dispatch g s,t and capacity G s :
while from KKT complementary slackness we get for the inequality constraints: μ s,t g s,t = 0 (10)
We will now show that each generator s exactly makes back their costs c s G s + t o s g s,t from their market revenue t λ t g s,t , i.e. the 'zero-profit condition'.
The first step substitutes the equations from KKT stationarity; in the second step terms are reorganised; in the final step the equations from KKT complementary slackness are applied. We can use this, along with primal feasibility for the demand balancing constraint (5) , to show that the total generator costs are equal to the total payments by consumers:
For a situation with inelastic demand where we can reduce the overall problem to generator cost minimisation, this is the statement of strong duality between the objectives of the primal and dual problems. Note, however, that equation (12) also holds at the level of individual generators.
LCOE, MV and RMV without policy measures
When both sides of (12) are divided by the generator's total dispatch we recover on the left the definition of the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) of the generator:
and on the right the definition of the market value (MV) of the generator, sometimes called the absolute market value [12] , which gives us the average revenue when the generator is producing:
The equality (12) then gives us:
This is a restatement of the zero-profit rule on an averaged per-MWh basis. The relative market value (RMV), also called the value factor in [12] , is the ratio of the market value to the load-weighted average market price:
Using the zero-profit rule (12) and the energy balance constraint (5) we can rewrite the RMV:
r c r G r + r,t o r g r,t t g s,t a,t d a,t −1 (18) From this it can be seen that in the absence of other constraints, the RMV is the ratio of a technology's share of total costs (first fraction) to its share of demand (second fraction). If a particular technology has a similar share of both energy provision and costs, then it will have a RMV close to unity.
Long-term equilibrium with VRE policy
If a subset of generators S is singled out and forced to meet a fixed proportion of the demand, this is represented with the constraint
For example, for a particular penetration of wind, S would represent all wind generators and Γ would be a fixed fraction of the annual demand. For generators included in the constraint, s ∈ S , the stationarity equation (8) for g s,t from the previous section is altered to
so that now for the generators in S
For generators excluded from the constraint, s S , the zeroprofit rule remains exactly the same as (12) .
If (19) is not binding, then µ Γ = 0 and the zero-profit rule is recovered. In this case the given share is already part of the unconstrained optimum. However if (19) is binding, then more generation from S is being forced into the solution than the optimum without constraint (19) , therefore µ Γ > 0 and generators in S can no longer recover their costs from the market prices λ t alone. µ Γ represents the per-MWh subsidy, or Feed-in Premium (FiP), required beyond the market price for generators in S to recover their costs.
Dividing by the total generation t g s,t we find for s ∈ S
For s S we have the regular no-profit rule
Expressed another way: forcing in the penetration of a particular technology above its unconstrained optimal share depresses the market prices λ t at the times when it is generating. This accounts for the 'market value' effect in long-term equilibrium models observed in [12] .
The solution found here, including the values of all primal and dual variables, can be reproduced by removing the constraint (19) and making the substitution o s → o s − µ Γ for s ∈ S , i.e. moving µ Γ g s,t to the left-hand side of (21) (see proof in Appendix B.6). The VRE policy thus depresses market prices by two mechanisms: when VRE are generating, the merit order effect pushes down prices even when VRE generators are not price-setting; when VRE generators are price-setting, they can turn the market prices negative if µ Γ is larger than their marginal cost o s . Negative bids are rational for generators if they are guaranteed the subsidy even when prices are negative. In reality, some markets suspend support for subsidized generators bidding in the market once market prices turn negative for a sufficient time (6 hours in the case of Germany [34] ), thereby removing the incentive for them to bid negative prices and thus mitigating this effect. In this case, examined in Appendix E.2, VRE policies still depress prices by the merit order effect.
Long-term equilibrium with CO 2 policy
If, rather than picking particular technologies, we replace constraint (19) with a CO 2 cap K, the behaviour is different. Consider the CO 2 constraint:
where e s is the emission factor in tonne-CO 2 per MWh el for generator s and K is a cap on yearly emissions in tonne-CO 2 per year. This constraint has the same form as (19) , except for the direction of the inequality sign and the weighting of generation.
The stationarity equation (8) is altered to
and now
If the constraint (24) is binding, it pushes up market prices beyond the cost-recovery point so that charges for CO 2 emissions are also covered from the market. Dividing by the total generation t g s,t we find
In this case, generators with no direct emissions, e s = 0, continue to satisfy the zero-profit rule. Emitting generators with e s > 0 have to cover the CO 2 price with their market revenues, but still recover their costs once the CO 2 levy has been paid.
The same solution can be obtained by replacing the CO 2 constraint with a direct cost of CO 2 and making the substitution o s → o s + e s µ CO 2 , i.e. moving the term e s µ CO 2 g s,t to the lefthand side of (26) . Through the higher effective operating costs for CO 2 -emitting generators, the CO 2 price increases market prices when these generators are setting the price.
More complicated setups
Proofs for more complicated setups (fixed shares for available rather than dispatched energy, limited installation potentials, multi-node networks, storage, non-linear generation costs) can be found in Appendix B.
Numerical power system model description
The theoretical insights developed above are demonstrated in a numerical market model based on EMMA [12] that has been reimplemented in the open PyPSA framework [28] . The code for the model is available online under an open licence [35] .
The model has five nodes for Germany and four of its neighbours: Poland, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. The model minimizes long-term generation costs over historical hourly load and weather for the year 2010, assuming an inelastic demand and a high value of lost load (1000 A C/MWh). The model completely rebuilds the existing system ('greenfield investment') except for pumped hydro storage, for which existing capacities are taken assuming an energy storage capacity of eight hours at nominal power.
Generators are aggregated into representative classes for each technology. The available variable renewable technologies are wind and solar power, while the dispatchable generators are coal, lignite, lignite with CCS, nuclear, open cycle gas turbines (OCGT) and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). We keep most of EMMA's cost and other technical assumptions, but update the wind cost from 1300 A C/kWp to 1040 A C/kWp and the solar cost from 2000 A C/kWp to 510 A C/kWp to reflect forecasts for 2030 made by the Danish Energy Agency in 2019 [36] (these assumptions are conservative given that some studies see a cost of 460 A C/kWp for utility solar already today [37] ; with our assumptions the LCOE of wind and solar are still above reverse auction results in Germany in 2019). A table of technology assumptions can be found in Appendix C. To concentrate on the interaction of market policy and market prices, the wind and solar costs are fixed for the simulations and no learning effects are applied for high penetrations of wind and solar that might reduce costs. In addition, we remove the options for new nuclear and CCS in order to focus on the penetration of variable renewable energy; further simulations with nuclear are presented in Appendix E. The removal of the options for new nuclear and CCS can also be seen as representative of the policy environment in countries like Germany with regard to these technologies. Based on the results for total system cost below, the cost point at which these dispatchable technologies would compete with wind and solar can be deduced ex post.
Transmission capacities between countries are fixed at the net transfer capacities (NTC) values from summer 2010. Following [12] a discount rate of 7% is applied. To ensure that additional constraints do not distort the theoretical picture developed in the previous section, we do not assume a baseload premium (whereby nuclear, coal and lignite run even if their variable cost is higher than the market price) nor do we model reserve requirements or revenue from reserve markets. To avoid interference with the CO 2 policy we introduce here, we also remove the CO 2 price of 20 A C/tCO 2 assumed as a default in [12] .
In Appendix D we compare the results for the relative market value to the result from [12] , with and without the technology assumption changes. We find good agreement between the models.
To explore the impact of flexibility, in some scenarios we also allow the expansion of the transmission grid and the instal- lation of new storage in the form of batteries and underground hydrogen storage (based on electrolysis of water and hydrogen turbines to feed back into the grid).
Numerical results

The market value of wind and solar depend on the policy measure
We contrast two main cases, one where VRE generation is driven by a constraint on minimum penetration level (VRE policy) and another case where VRE generation is driven indirectly by a cap on CO 2 emissions (CO 2 policy), which makes fossilfueled generation more costly and thus boosts VRE generation in the cost minimization. Technically, the VRE policy is implemented by a constraint in the optimization model (equation (19) ) that mandates a certain share of the demand be fulfilled by wind and solar. The CO 2 policy is implemented with a con- straint on the maximum CO 2 emissions, which corresponds to a tax on CO 2 -emitting generators (equation (24)).
The resulting market value (MV) at penetration levels for wind and solar between 0 and 70% for these two cases are shown in Figure 3 . The results for the VRE policy case confirm what is widely seen in the literature [12] : MV declines with rising penetration, eventually dropping to zero at a VRE penetration of 50%. The CO 2 policy shows a quite different trend: the MV dips slightly, then increases gently up to just over 80 A C/MWh at 70% penetration.
This shows clearly that market value behaves differently depending on the policy used to reach a given level of wind and solar generation. Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the MV, LCOE and Feed-in-Premium (FiP) µ s 1 for the VRE policy. The LCOE remains approximately constant, dipping first and then rising gently. The dip occurs because of the changing mix of wind and solar, which have different LCOEs: first wind is preferred, which has a higher LCOE but a more regular profile, then solar increases, which has a lower LCOE, before wind takes over again at higher penetrations. The rise in LCOE reflects a preference for wind at higher penetrations, as well as curtailment which impacts the total generation in the denominator of the LCOE.
Market value with VRE policy
The FiP has to make up the difference between the MV and LCOE, and thus rises accordingly. The FiP is always positive because the equilibrium solution without the VRE policy does not contain wind and solar (since the cost of generation from fossil fuels is so low in the model). The MV can reach zero and even become negative, since the FiP can force market prices to be negative in some hours; simulations where negative prices are forbidden are presented in Appendix E.2. Figure 5 shows the MV, LCOE and CO 2 tax µ CO 2 2 for the CO 2 policy.
Market value with CO 2 policy
Since wind and solar have no direct CO 2 emissions, by equation (3) the LCOE is exactly equal to the MV. The dip and gentle rise of LCOE has the same explanation as for the VRE policy (see Figure E .20 for the changing shares of wind and solar).
The CO 2 price required to induce a given VRE penetration rises to 70 A C/tCO 2 at a penetration of 50%, before rapidly rising to above 220 A C/tCO 2 at 70%. 70 A C/tCO 2 represents a tripling of 2019 CO 2 certificate prices in the European Union Emissions Trading System (ETS), but is only marginally more than the 45-55 A C/tCO 2 range in 2030 required to fulfil the Paris Agreement according to recent modelling [38] , and considerably less than the estimated 180 A C/tCO 2 damages due to climate change [39] . Until 50% penetration the behaviour of the system under a CO 2 policy only requires moderate changes. Beyond 50%, the lack of additional flexibility options makes CO 2 mitigation more expensive. Figure 6 compares the rising average system generation cost for the two policies, including all capital and marginal costs but excluding subsidies and the CO 2 price. The costs rises at a similar rate with VRE penetration, but are slightly higher for the CO 2 policy. Costs are higher with a CO 2 policy because increasing wind and solar penetration is not the only costeffective measure to reduce CO 2 emissions: switching from lignite and coal to natural gas is prioritized before VRE capacity at some penetrations. These measures make the system more expensive than the VRE policy case for a given VRE penetration. (If we compare the policies based on CO 2 emissions, then the CO 2 policy is naturally more efficient at reducing emissions, see Appendix Figure E .23.) Figure 6 also shows how the load-weighted average electricity price changes with penetration for each policy. For the VRE policy, prices are depressed by the merit order effect when VRE generate and by negative prices when VRE are price-setting, as discussed in Section 4.3. For the CO 2 policy the merit order effect of VRE generation is counter-acted by the increasing cost of fossil-fuelled generation, pushing up prices when these generators are price-setting (see Section 4.4).
System cost and market price
For the VRE policy, consumers pay less than the generation cost, since the difference between the average market price and the generation cost is accounted for by the external subsidies paid to VRE generation. For the CO 2 policy, consumers pay more than the generation cost, since they must also pay for CO 2 emissions according to the prevailing CO 2 price.
Including transmission and storage flexibility
If additional flexibility options are made available to the investment optimization, the market value remains regular all the way up to 100% VRE penetration with a CO 2 policy. Flexibility in this case includes the option to build new transmission capacity between the countries, as well as the availability of both battery storage and hydrogen storage (based on electrolysis of water and hydrogen turbines to feed back into the grid). The results for MV with and without flexibility are shown in Figure  7 . Without flexibility, the MV increases strongly above 70% because of high curtailment that depresses the LCOE. High curtailment reflects the mismatch between VRE and demand profiles. With flexibility, the MV rises slowly before plateauing at around 70 A C/MWh. At 100% penetration the average total system cost is higher at 103 A C/MWh, reflecting the additional flexibility options, in this case primarily the hydrogen storage. Figure 8 : Breakdown of average system cost (total cost divided by total load) under a CO 2 policy as the CO 2 budget is tightened, for a scenario with transmission expansion as well as short-and long-term storage. The average system cost, including the CO 2 price, is equal to the load-weighted average market price by equation (13).
The CO 2 price rises more or less linearly from 50% to 100% penetration to a final value of 150 A C/tCO 2 (less than the climate damages of 180 A C/tCO 2 estimated in [39]). The breakdown of system cost by component in Figure 8 shows the substitution of technologies as the CO 2 limit is tightened. Hydrogen storage is critical for removing the final emissions from the system, since hydrogen can smooth the variability of wind and solar over multiple days. The fact that wind and solar dominate system costs at the same time as dominating energy generation guarantees a relative market value (RMV) close to unity according to equation (18) , which is in agreement with the closeness of market price to market value in Figure E.21. Similar results have also been shown in a model coupled to building heating and transport, where demand response from electric vehicles and heat pumps, as well as cheap storage of heat, hydrogen and methane, help to support prices and keep the RMV close to unity [32] .
Discussion
The mechanisms underlying MV decline
This paper contrasts the impact of VRE-and CO 2 policies on the market value (MV) of wind and solar. We find that the MV decreases strongly under VRE policies, but not under CO 2 policies. Thus, the declining MV of VRE that has been observed in previous literature [10, 12, 15, 40] is due primarily to the implicit assumption of policy regime, and not, as has been claimed before [12, 15] , to the variability of wind and solar.
Previous papers on market value have viewed a CO 2 price as one among many other mechanisms by which the MV decline can be mitigated under a VRE policy regime [12, 40, 41] . In contrast, we make the CO 2 price the primary mechanism for raising VRE penetration.
We grant a whole host of strategies, which can be collectively labeled 'flexibility measures' 3 , as having the potential to dampen the MV decline under a VRE policy, yet not solving the bigger issue of the 'cannibalization effect' [43] . Thus, we do recognize the fact that variability matters as to the rate of decline of MV under VRE policies. One example of this is that the rate of MV decline differs depending on the temporal pattern and cost structure of the technology that is forced in (compare the effect of a VRE policy in Figure 4 with a policy to force in nuclear in Appendix Figure E.14) 4 . Policy driven by a CO 2 price, however, has the potential to prevent any MV decline, in addition to its other advantages of being technologically neutral and economically efficient [44, 45] .
Policy implications
The main policy implication is that policy makers should not see market value decline under VRE policies as an indication that variable renewable energy is hitting fundamental integration limits. MV decline is a result of policy choices rather than an intrinsic property of VRE. The strong dependence of market value on the policy regime (and on the rest of the system composition) means that market value should be used with a keen awareness of its limitations. Just as the LCOE metric does not provide a complete picture of the cost performance of technologies [46] , market value should be used in concert with other metrics when comparing technologies.
There are many situations where VRE policies are preferable to CO 2 policies, such as when encouraging research, development and deployment, and reducing investor risk, or because in some jurisdictions subsidies are more popular and easier to implement than taxes. In these cases the measure of successful integration should be the total cost of the system, as well as secondary measures such as the curtailment rate, rather than market value. Comparison to the economically efficient solution with a CO 2 policy may also provide useful guidance.
Effects on investors
The cost of capital for VRE investors depends on the perceived risk profile. The financial risk may differ substantially under VRE-and CO 2 policies: CO 2 policies send a market signal to encourage low-emission generation, whereas one of the main purposes of VRE policies is to provide investor certainty for capital-intensive investments that might otherwise be subject to market risks from fluctuating electricity and CO 2 prices [47, 48] . Lower risk means lower financing costs, which feeds through to a lower LCOE [49] [50] [51] . A hybrid policy framework can provide both of these benefits: a CO 2 price to support lowemission generation, and a guaranteed per-kWh feed-in-tariff for VRE generation that is tuned to be close to the market value so that it provides investor certainty with minimal market distortion (i.e. the Feed-in Premium, µ Γ in equation (1), is close to zero).
Effects on consumer welfare
The different policies have a strong effect on the average electricity price that consumers have to pay on the market ( Figure  6 ). VRE policies lower prices and thus increase the consumer surplus; if the demand were elastic, lower prices would also increase the consumption rate. The surplus can be reduced by passing on the costs of covering the FiP to consumers, but the consumption rate will still be higher than is economically efficient. A CO 2 policy more efficiently reflects climate costs and the necessary trade-offs in the economy.
Negative prices
With the price formation mechanism used here, prices may become negative, since the electricity price in the model for a VRE policy reflects a situation where the VRE generator bids in its running cost less a feed-in premium equivalent to the shadow cost of the VRE-constraint. A similar construct was used and negative prices were observed by Pahle et al. [29] . (In setups where the available energy rather than the dispatched energy is constrained [12] VRE support does not cause negative prices, see the discussion in Appendix B.1.)
In reality, some countries have policies that withdraw subsidies when prices go negative for a long period of time (6 hours in the case of Germany [34] ). Under such policy regimes, it would be rational for the producer never to bid in less than its running costs to the market, and thus the market prices would be higher. In such cases, the electricity price decreases only slightly for increasing penetration levels of VRE (see Appendix E.2). 7.6. MV under different policies in reality: the example of Germany It is undisputed that the revenues from sales on the market for VRE generators have decreased in the real world, which has been shown in several studies on historical data for electricity prices [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 12] . While this is partly due to short-term effects as the rest of the system takes time to reach a new equilibrium with VRE, it also reflects policy choices. In Germany, subsidies were used to increase the share of VRE in electricity to around 26% in 2018. The average power price and market values of wind and solar fell from 2011 to 2016, as can be seen in Figure 9 . This is an effect of the FiT policy regime (which is a VRE policy) combined with falling fuel prices. However, from 2016 onwards, prices increase again, with market values approaching current German LCOEs for wind and solar. This has been attributed to an increasing CO 2 price on the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) market (a CO 2 policy) [52] . Thus the German prices ( Figure 9 ) may be interpreted as a supporting argument for our evaluation of the effect when VRE policies dominate (up until 2016) and when CO 2 policies have a strong effect (after 2016).
Limitations of this study
In this study we have focused on the mechanisms connecting cost, price and policy. Many of the numerical results depend on the background system choices we have made. The base 
Conclusions
The market value of wind and solar (VRE) depends strongly on the policies used to promote them. Previous studies have implicitly assumed that direct subsidies are used to force VRE penetration, which have the effect of depressing both their market value and overall market prices. If instead a CO 2 price is used to promote low-emission generation, market values in long-term equilibria are guaranteed to cover generator costs. Market values remain stable even at VRE penetrations approaching 100%, as long as sufficient flexibility from transmission and storage is available in the system. This means that declining market value under VRE policies is not a reliable indicator of problems with the market integration of VRE. Declining market value is rather a side-effect of choosing a VRE policy. A better measure of market integration is the total system cost, or secondary measures such as curtailment levels.
By showing the strong dependence of market value on policy choice, we have thus resolved the paradox between the economic literature showing market value decline with penetration under VRE policies, and the engineering literature showing that high penetrations of VRE can be cost-effective under CO 2 policies.
Appendix A. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
In this section we set the signs and notation for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
We have an objective function over variables labelled by l:
subject to equality (i) and inequality ( j) constraints:
We build the KKT Lagrangian:
The KKT conditions are equations satisfied by x l , λ i and µ j at the optimum point. First we have stationarity:
then primal feasibility:
then dual feasibility:
and finally complementary slackness:
µ j h j (x l ) = 0 (A.9) (i.e. either µ j = 0 or the inequality constraint is saturated h j (x l ) = 0).
Appendix B. Further Proofs
Appendix B.1. Single node long-term equilibrium with VRE policy for available power
If we add a constraint for a subset S of generators based on the available power before curtailment, as is done in [12] , rather than the actual dispatched power If there is no curtailment,ḡ s,t G s = g s,t and this becomes the same expression as (21) .
Since µ Θ multiplies the capacity G s , this can be interpreted as a subsidy for capacity. (In Section 4.3 we fixed the share of dispatched generation instead, so there it was a subsidy on dispatch.) This means the effective marginal cost is not affected and does not go negative. This makes sense because if capacity is subsidised, generators have no incentive to feed in when prices are negative. Instead, they curtail the available energy.
Dividing (B.3) by the total generation t g s,t we find for s ∈ S We've effectively added to the capital cost c s a cost related to the scarcity of the potential for G s , which drives up the cost. Because the resource is scarce, generators can claim extra revenue for this scarcity, i.e. because there is no replacement, there is extra profit to be obtained from the market.
Appendix B.4. Multi-node long-term equilibrium with network
For multiple nodes the demand and generator variables gain an extra index for the node n to which they are attached, and a term is added to the objective function for the costs c of each line capacity F connecting the nodes:
The flow can move electricity from one node to the other in each hour f ,t , so that the nodal balance equation is modified a d n,a,t − s g n,s,t = K n f ,t ⊥ λ n,t ∀n, t
where K n is the incidence matrix for the network. This is Kirchhoff's Current Law (KCL). There are additional constraints on the flows related to the line capacity
and to Kirchhoff's Voltage Law (KVL):
where c label an independent basis of closed cycles in the network defined by the cycle matrix C ,c , and x is the series reactance of the line. From KKT stationarity we get in addition:
and for complementary slackness:
The no-profit rule becomes:
The first term is the sum over flows f ,t multiplied by the price difference between the connect nodes t,n λ n,t K n, , i.e. the congestion revenue. The second term is a distortion that disappears if KVL is not enforced (i.e. in a transport model with only KCL, it would not appear).
Without KVL total costs still equal total revenue, analogous to (13) 
Now the relationship between costs and revenue becomes This becomes a statement about marginal profit, i.e. small additions of capacity or generation will not generate any profit or loss.
Generators with cost functions with positive derivatives will make a profit since revenue will be higher than costs. For example, if C s (G s ) = c s G n s for n > 1 and there are no operating costs, the revenue will be nc s G n s , n times higher than the cost. These generators may however be undercut by other generators in the market with different cost functions.
The effects of VRE and CO 2 policies on market value are unchanged.
Appendix B.6. Equivalent problems without constraints
If we have a generic optimisation problem with variables x l , y m of the form max
subject to equality and inequality constraints:
then we can prove that at the optimal point the solutions for x l , y m , λ l , µ j are identical to the following problem without the final constraint (B.40), where we have frozen µ from the above problem:
This holds as long as the maximization problem is a concave function, the inequality constraints are continuously differentiable convex functions and the equality constraints are affine functions (i.e. as long as the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality).
The proof is standard in Lagrangian theory and follows by showing that the KKT conditions are identical. From the first problem the only conditions where the extra constraint is relevant is the stationarity for y m
This is the same as the stationarity for the second problem. If the final constraint (B.40) is not binding, then µ = 0 by complimentarity and the problems are also identical. QED.
Appendix C. Technology assumptions
The technology assumptions from the original model EMMA [12] and our model PyPSA are compared in Table C .1. While nuclear and lignite with CCS are disabled in the main calculations, for the calculations in the Appendix with nuclear the costs from [54] are applied, to reflect experience in recent projects.
Power plant lifetimes are taken from [12] (nuclear has a lifetime of 50 years, while other plants have 25 years).
Battery assumptions are drawn from [21] , hydrogen (H 2 ) electrolysis from [55] and underground H2 storage from [56] .
Appendix D. Comparison of PyPSA to EMMA results for RMV
In this section the results from [12] for the long-term relative market values of solar and wind are compared to the results from the reimplementation in PyPSA. Figure D.10 shows the relative market values in the PyPSA model with the same technology assumptions as [12] and with a constraint on available renewable energy following [12] (see Appendix B.1). Figure  D.11 shows the results with the wind and solar costs updated, the CO 2 price set to zero, the removal of nuclear and CCS as options, and a constraint on dispatched renewable energy following Section 4.3. Table D there is clear agreement in the overall shape and trajectory of the curves, in three of the four cases PyPSA underestimates the relative market values compared to EMMA, particularly for the case of solar at 15% penetration. There are several factors causing the disagreement between EMMA and PyPSA: EMMA has baseload incentives which alter prices; EMMA has incentives for flexible generators like OCGT that reduce their capital costs, encouraging higher marginal cost generators into the market and pushing up prices; for the denominator of the RMV, EMMA takes a simple price average over time, while PyPSA load-weights average prices over time (emphasising times of high load when prices are either higher (evening) or lower (midday solar peak)); and finally it appears the EMMA code uses a lifetime of 25 years for nuclear rather than the 50 years applied here. The solar disagreement is also large because the slope of the curve here is steep, so any deviation is magnified.
Next we compare the results from the reimplementation in PyPSA (column 2 in Table D Figures D.10 and D.11 by the fact that the case with both wind and solar now differs from the pure wind case, since solar is competitive. The reduction of the CO 2 price from 20 A C /tCO 2 to zero helps to suppress prices. And finally the constraint on dispatched energy rather than available energy means that costs decrease faster and go to zero, since VRE subsidy can cause hours of negative prices. When we constrain available energy, VRE is curtailed at zero price, meaning that RMV flatlines at high penetrations as in Figure D The solar market value declines much faster than for wind, as has been seen in previous results in this paper and elsewhere in the literature.
The effect of forced penetration on nuclear is similar. The equilibrium solution with the VRE constraint does not contain nuclear, because the cost is too high; a non-zero subsidy is required to cover the difference between its average market value Appendix E.2. VRE policy with no negative prices In this section we take the results from the VRE policy and forbid negative prices, by setting the price to zero whenever it goes below zero. The results for systems without additional flexibility are shown for wind and solar in Figure E to replace natural gas. The CO 2 price required to reach each target rises in steps as particular fuels are substituted, before rising very steeply below 0.3 tCO 2 /MWhel, where it gets harder to match the variable profiles of wind and solar with the load. The market price increases with a stricter CO 2 constraint, since the rising CO 2 price increases all effective marginal costs o s → o s + e s µ K . The market values of wind and solar initially remain steady, since they are equal to the LCOE, which is stable. However, as penetration rises, curtailment increases and the LCOE drops. ment is limited and a VRE penetration of 100% without either the average market price (which reflects total system cost) or the market values rising drastically.
Appendix E.4. Comparing system cost as function CO 2 emissions
In Figure 6 we compared the system costs under the VRE and CO 2 policies as a function of the penetration of wind and solar without flexibility. In Figure E .23 we provide the complementary figure comparing the system costs of the two policies as a function of average system CO 2 intensity. For the system setup here, the policies provide similar results until higher penetrations, at which the CO 2 policy is, unsurprisingly, more efficient at reducing CO 2 emissions. 
